

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/29 : CIA-RDP96M01138R000400090029-3

REL *pen*  
DP *W*

WKG \_\_\_\_\_

~~DTB~~ \_\_\_\_\_

FH \_\_\_\_\_

GMD \_\_\_\_\_

File: 3.7.2

Destroy: \_\_\_\_\_

Return to: \_\_\_\_\_

Remarks: \_\_\_\_\_

7/12

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/29 : CIA-RDP96M01138R000400090029-3

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/29 : CIA-RDP96M01138R000400090029-3

**Page Denied**

~~SECRET~~

25X1

82 9775809

SSO

PAGE 001

NC 9775809

TOR: 291923Z OCT 82

OO RUEAIIB  
 ZNY SSSSS ZOC STATE ZZH  
 UTS3660  
 OO RUEHC  
 DE RUDKRP #4677/01 3021630  
 ZNY SSSSS ZZH  
 O 291547Z OCT 82  
 FM AMEMBASSY PRAGUE  
 TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9057  
 RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY  
 INFO RUEHIA/USIA WASHDC 498  
 BT

~~SECRET~~ PRAGUE 4677

DIA FOR AT//AT-4/CS

25X1

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
 TAGS: PEPR PDIP PINS PINR US CZ  
 SUBJECT: IMPLICATION OF INCIDENTS INVOLVING EMBASSY PERSONNEL

## 1. S-ENTIRE MESSAGE.

2. SUMMARY. IN REVIEWING THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE SERIES OF INCIDENTS TO WHICH EMBASSY PERSONNEL HAVE BEEN SUBJECTED SINCE JULY, WE FIND INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO CONVINCE US THAT WE ARE FACING A PRE-PLANNED CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE EMBASSY AS A WHOLE. THE PREPONDERANCE OF EVIDENCE FAVORS THE HYPOTHESIS THAT THESE INCIDENTS HAVE BEEN THE RESULT OF CZECHOSLOVAK SECURITY ORGANS' PURSUING SPECIFIC AND LIMITED (BUT NONETHELESS UNACCEPTABLE) OBJECTIVES. WHILE THE IMPERMISSIBLE MEANS THEY HAVE USED IN THE MOST RECENT INCIDENTS AS WELL AS THE UNACCEPTABILITY OF THEIR OBJECTIVES REQUIRE APPROPRIATE U.S. RESPONSES, WE WOULD ADVISE A CAREFUL CALIBRATION OF RETALIATORY MEASURES, WHICH SHOULD BE SUFFICIENT TO EXACT A STIFF PRICE FOR CZECHOSLOVAK MISBEHAVIOUR AND TO DETER REPETITION BUT NOT OF THE SORT WHICH COULD RESULT IN A GREATER DAMAGE TO U.S. INTERESTS THAN TO THOSE OF THE CZECHOSLOVAK REGIME.  
 END SUMMARY.

3. THE LATEST PIPER INCIDENT RAISES IN ACUTE FORM THE QUESTION WHETHER WE ARE FACING A CALCULATED SERIES OF INCIDENTS DESIGNED TO DEPRESS EVEN FURTHER U.S.-CZECHOSLOVAK RELATIONS OR WHETHER THESE INCIDENTS HAVE ARISEN FROM SEPARATE AND MORE LIMITED MOTIVATIONS ON THE PART OF THE CZECHOSLOVAK AUTHORITIES. SINCE THE ANSWER TO THIS QUESTION HAS A BEARING ON THE CHARACTER OF AN APPROPRIATE RESPONSE ON OUR PART, THIS MESSAGE WILL ATTEMPT TO ASSESS THE LIMITED EVIDENCE WE HAVE OF CZECHOSLOVAK MOTIVATIONS.

4. THE PIPER INCIDENTS: FROM OUR VANTAGE POINT WE ARE CERTAIN THAT IN AT LEAST ONE OF THE INCIDENTS--KOSICE-- COLONEL PIPER EXPERIENCED A CONCERTED EFFORT TO APPREHEND HIM IN AN ACT OF ESPIONAGE. IN THE OTHER TWO INCIDENTS ATTEMPTS WERE MADE TO TIE PIPER TO SPECIFIC ACTS OF ESPIONAGE AFTER HIS PRESENCE WAS DETECTED BY LOCAL OFFICIALS. AS A MINIMUM, WE VIEW THESE ACTIONS AS A WARNING TO ALL

25X1

~~SECRET~~

**SECRET**

82 9775809

SSO

PAGE 002

NC 9775809

TOR: 291923Z OCT 82

TO AVOID BEING AGGRESSIVE IN THEIR TRAVEL IN THE VICINITY OF MILITARY INSTALLATIONS. AS WE HAVE POINTED OUT IN OUR MESSAGES DEALING WITH POSSIBLE TRAVEL CONTROLS, OUR ATTACHES--AS WELL AS THEIR WESTERN COLLEAGUES--MAKE GOOD USE OF THEIR FREEDOM TO TRAVEL ABOUT THE COUNTRY AND HAVE FOLLOWED AN AGGRESSIVE COLLECTION CAMPAIGN TO THE VERY EDGE OF FORMAL TRESPASS ON POSTED RESTRICTED AREAS.

AUTHORITIES, AND DOUBTLESS ANNOYS THEM GREATLY. THEY CLEARLY HAVE AN INCENTIVE TO TRY TO DETER IT, PARTICULARLY IF THIS CAN BE DONE AT LITTLE COST TO THEIR OWN COLLECTION EFFORTS, WHICH FOLLOW A DIFFERENT PATTERN AND ARE NOT SO DEPENDENT ON TRAVEL AND VISUAL OBSERVATION.

5. THERE ALSO MAY BE AN ADDED AND EVEN MORE COMPELLING INCENTIVE AT THE PRESENT TIME TO MAKE A TOUGH SHOW OF PREVENTING DIRECT OBSERVATION OF MILITARY INSTALLATIONS.

PRESENCE AROUND SOVIET INSTALLATIONS IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA. THIS RAISES THE SUSPICION THAT THE SOVIET HAVE PERHAPS PROTESTED WHT THEY REGARD AS LAX CZECHOSLOVAK SECURITY AROUND THEIR INSTALLATIONS WHICH ALLOWS

EVEN DURING PERIODS OF HEIGHTENED ACTIVITY SUCH AS THE TROOP ROTATION CYCLE. (ONE RUMOR AROUND TOWN IS THAT MARSHAL USTINOV SPECIFICALLY RAISED THIS ISSUE DURING HIS OFFICIAL VISIT TO CZECHOSLOVAKIA.) IF THIS SHOULD BE THE CASE, THE CZECHOSLOVAK INCENTIVE WILL BE VERY HIGH TO MAKE A SHOW OF VIGOROUS SECURITY ENFORCEMENT, PARTICULARLY IN THE VICINITY OF SOVIET ACTIVITY. WE NOTE IN THIS CONNECTION THAT BOTH OF THE RECENT INCIDENTS OCCURRED IN AREAS WHERE SOVIET TROOP ROTATION WAS OCCURRING.

6. IN BRIEF, SO FAR AS THE PIPER INCIDENTS ARE CONCERNED, WE CAN DISCERN CLEAR CZECHOSLOVAK INCENTIVES TO REDUCE

WE SUSPECT THAT THE REASONS THE CZECHOSLOVAK AUTHORITIES DID NOT EXPEL PIPER AFTER EITHER OF THE FIRST TWO INCIDENTS--AND HAVE NOT YET DONE SO FOLLOWING THE THIRD--WERE AT LEAST TWO: FIRST, THEY HAVE NO REAL EVIDENCE OF ILLEGAL ACTIVITY; AND SECOND, THEY DO NOT WANT TO RISK THE RETALIATORY STEPS THEY CAN BE CERTAIN WE WOULD TAKE. NOW THAT THE THIRD INCIDENT HAS OCCURRED (DURING WHICH THEY WERE CAREFUL NOT TO VIOLATE HIS DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY IN ANY RESPECT EXCEPT FOR IMPEDING THE MOVEMENT OF HIS VEHICLE), FORMAL EXPULSION BECOMES SOMEWHAT MORE LIKELY, BUT THE INITIAL CZECHOSLOVAK REACTION HAS STOPPED SHORT OF THIS STEP. IF THERE SHOULD BE A BASIS FOR OUR SUSPICION THAT THE SOVIETS MAY BE DEMANDING BETTER SECURITY FOR THEIR TROOP MOVEMENTS IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA, THE CZECHS OBVIOUSLY WILL PAY WHATEVER PRICE IS REQUIRED TO SATISFY THEIR SOVIET MASTERS. THOUGH THEY MAY TRY TO ADJUST THEIR TACTICS TO MINIMIZE THE DAMAGE TO THEIR INTERESTS. THEY DOUBTLESS ASSUME THAT IF THEY EXPEL PIPER WE WILL, AS A MINIMUM, EXPEL HIS COUNTERPART IN WASHINGTON.

DIA FOR AT//AT-4/CS

7. CONNECTION WITH LEMAISTRE-WILLIAMS?: SINCE THE FIRST PIPER INCIDENT FOLLOWED ONLY SEVERAL WEEKS AFTER A STAGED PROVOCATION AGAINST OUR ACTING PAO AND THE

**SECRET**

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

**SECRET**

82 9775809

SSO

PAGE 003

NC 9775809

TOR: 291923Z OCT 82

REFUSAL OF A VISA FOR A NEW PAO (APPARENTLY BECAUSE HE HAD EARLIER BEEN THE OBJECT OF A DISINFORMATION CAMPAIGN IN THE CZECHOSLOVAK PRESS), ONE IS TEMPTED TO DRAW THE CONCLUSION THAT WE ARE SUBJECT TO A PREMEDITATED AND ORGANIZED CAMPAIGN TO HARRASS EMBASSY PERSONNEL. THE COMMON DENOMINATORS OF THE LEMAISTRE AND PIPER INCIDENTS WERE VIOLATIONS OF DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY AND ATTEMPTS TO FABRICATE EVIDENCE OF WRONG-DOING. (IN THE WILLIAMS CASE, THE VISA WAS MERELY CANCELLED). BUT THE APPARENT MOTIVATION FOR THESE INCIDENTS WAS SOMEWHAT DIFFERENT FROM THAT WHICH WE CAN SURMISE FOR THE PIPER INCIDENTS: IN THE P&C CASES THE MOTIVATION SEEMS TO HAVE BEEN TO DETER EMBASSY CONTACTS WITH DISSIDENTS, TO PREVENT THE RETURN TO CZECHOSLOVAKIA OF OFFICERS WHO ARE WELL-KNOWN IN THE DISSIDENT COMMUNITY AND HAVE MANY CONTACTS THERE, AND TO HAMPER THE EMBASSY'S INCREASINGLY ACTIVE PUBLIC AFFAIRS PROGRAM. THIS BRINGS FORTH ANOTHER COMMON DENOMINATOR IN ALL THE ACTIONS: ATTEMPTS TO DETER OR PREVENT EMBASSY ACTIVITIES WHICH ARE IN THE STRICT SENSE LEGAL AND BY U.S. STANDARDS ENTIRELY PROPER, BUT WHICH THE CZECHOSLOVAK AUTHORITIES FIND DISTASTEFUL.

8. DESPITE THE EXISTENCE OF THESE COMMON DENOMINATORS, HOWEVER, WE BELIEVE THAT THE EVIDENCE IS NOT CONCLUSIVE THAT THE SERIES OF INCIDENTS WAS PREPLANNED AS A CONCERTED CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE EMBASSY. DOUBTLESS CZECHOSLOVAK SECURITY OFFICIALS HAD BEEN AUTHORIZED AT THE POLITICAL LEVEL TO TAKE SOME SORT OF ACTION TO ACHIEVE THE SPECIFIC ENDS DESIRED. BUT THE PIPER INCIDENTS SEEM PRIMARILY RELATED TO HIGHTENED SECURITY AROUND MILITARY AREAS, PARTICULARLY THOSE WHERE SOVIET UNITS ARE STATIONED, RATHER THAN A DELIBERATE, PRE-PLANNED EFFORT TO COMPROMISE HIM AT ANY COST. IF THE LATTER HAD BEEN THE CZECHOSLOVAK INTENT, THEY PRESUMABLY WOULD HAVE BEEN MORE THOROUGH IN SETTING UP A CONCLUSIVE "INCIDENT" AND WOULD HAVE PROMPTLY CARRIED IT TO THE LOGICAL GOAL OF EXPULSION. AND IN ALL OF THESE INCIDENTS, TACTICS HAVE BEEN USED WHICH HAVE BEEN APPLIED TO US AND OTHER WESTERN REPRESENTATIVES IN THE PAST. AMONG OUR ALLIES, FRENCH, CANADIAN, BRITISH AND ITALIAN MILITARY ATTACHES HAVE BEEN SUBJECTED TO SIMILAR INCIDENTS OVER THE PAST TWO YEARS. THE FACT THAT THE CZECHOSLOVAK SECURITY ORGANS HAVE AN INGRAINED HABIT OF CREATING THESE KINDS OF INCIDENTS NEITHER CONSTITUTES AN EXCUSE NOR MAKES THE ACTIONS ACCEPTABLE FROM OUR POINT OF VIEW. BUT IT DOES MEAN THAT A PATTERN SUCH AS WE HAVE WITNESSED OVER THE PAST FEW MONTHS COULD ARISE WITHOUT OVERALL PREMEDITATION ON THE CZECHOSLOVAK PART, GIVEN THE NATURE OF THE SYSTEM AND OUR PERSISTENCE IN VIGOROUSLY PURSUING U.S. INTERESTS HERE.

9. THE U.S. RESPONSE: IN PLANNING OUR RESPONSE TO THE PIPER INCIDENTS, WE BELIEVE WE SHOULD KEEP TWO GUIDING CONSIDERATIONS FIRMLY IN MIND: FIRST, THAT THE SORT OF VIOLATIONS TO WHICH HE HAS BEEN SUBJECTED SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO PASS WITHOUT EFFECTIVE RETALIATION, AND SECOND, THAT SUCH RETALIATION BE CAREFULLY CALIBRATED TO DETER SUCH CZECHOSLOVAK BEHAVIOR IN THE FUTURE WITHOUT, HOWEVER, UNNECESSARILY CRIPPLING OUR OWN ACTIVITIES IN THE FUTURE. IF THE CZECHOSLOVAKS LET THE THIRD INCIDENT PASS WITHOUT EXPULSION THEY WILL HAVE IMPLICITLY PROVIDED EVIDENCE THAT THEY THEMSELVES CONSIDER THEIR CASE WEAK OR THAT THEY ARE AS YET UNPREPARED TO ACCEPT FURTHER INROADS INTO THEIR PRESENCE IN THE U.S., OR BOTH. WE CONTINUE TO BELIEVE THAT THE ACTION WHICH BEST SUITS THE CONSIDERATIONS SET FORTH ABOVE WOULD BE TO ARRANGE AN

**SECRET**

**SECRET**

82 9775809

SSO

PAGE 004

NC 9775809

TOR: 291923Z OCT 82

-----

INCIDENT INVOLVING THE CZECHOSLOVAK [REDACTED]  
 [REDACTED] WHICH BEARS AT LEAST SOME OF THE FEATURES OF  
 THOSE TO WHICH [REDACTED] FOR  
 EXAMPLE, IF THE CZECHOSLOVAK ATTACHE SHOULD VENTURE INTO  
 ANY RELATIVELY ISOLATED AREA, HIS CAR COULD BE BLOCKED,  
 MILITARY VEHICLES DRIVEN PAST HIM, AND THE SCENE  
 PHOTOGRAPHED OSTENTATIOUSLY. IF THIS IS EITHER  
 TECHNICALLY OR LEGALLY IMPOSSIBLE, A PERIOD OF CLOSE  
 AND INTRUSIVE SURVEILLANCE SHOULD BE CONSIDERED.  
 WHILE AFTER THE FIRST INCIDENT WE RECOMMENDED AGAINST  
 THIS STEP, WE BELIEVE THAT IT MAY BE APPROPRIATE AT  
 THIS POINT SINCE WE NOW HAVE LITTLE TO LOSE IF THE  
 PROCEDURE IS IMPOSED HERE. IT IS CLAR THAT COLONEL  
 PIPER MUST DESIST TEMPORARILY FROM PROBING ACTIVITIES  
 NEAR THE PERIMETER OF MILITARY ESTABLISHMENTS.

10. IN THE LONGER TERM, OF COURSE, WE SHOULD REFUSE  
 TO GIVE THE CZECHOSLOVAKS WHAT THEY ARE CLEARLY  
 PRESSING FOR: A STANDDOWN ON PROBING OBSERVATION  
 OF MILITARY INSTALLATIONS AND MOVEMENTS HERE. IT IS  
 CLEAR, HOWEVER, THAT EACH TIME PIPER IS APPREHENDED  
 IN AN AREA THE CZECHOSLOVAKS CONSIDER SENSITIVE (EVEN  
 THOUGH NOT FORMALLY POSTED AS SUCH), THE RISK RISES THAT  
 HE WILL BE EXPELLED AND--PERHAPS--MORE COMPREHENSIVE

[REDACTED] HERE.  
 THEREFORE WE BELIEVE THAT WE SHOULD MINIMIZE PIPER'S  
 EXPOSURE OVER THE NEXT FEW WEEKS AND UTILIZE THE COVERAGE  
 BY NATO ALLIES FOR A SHORT TIME, WITH THE INTENT TO  
 RESUME GRADUALLY OUR NORMAL COLLECTION PATTERN AFTER  
 A FEW WEEKS. IN THE MEANTIME, AN APPROPRIATE MEASURE  
 OF RETALIATION AGAINST PIPER'S COUNTERPART IN WASHINGTON  
 COULD HAVE A SALUTORY INFLUENCE ON THE SITUATION HERE.  
 MATLOCK

END OF MESSAGE

SECRET

25X1  
25X1  
25X1

25X1

**SECRET**